|since 2013||Ph.D. student at Washington University’s Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program;|
Master’s degree in PNP awarded in December 2015
|2011||Rutgers University, The Department of Philosophy, a year-long visit as a visiting student|
|2005-2010||The University of Wrocław, Master’s degree in Philosophy|
|2003-2008||Wrocław University of Economics, Master’s degree in Management and Marketing|
|2002-2007||The University of Wrocław, Master’s degree in Computer Science|
|Roddy Roediger||History of Psychology|
|Carl Craver||Topics in Advanced Philosophy of Science I: Evolution|
|Elizabeth Schechter, Charlie Kurth||Issues in Moral and Philosophical Psychology|
|David Queller||Population Genetics and Microevolution|
|Anya Plutynski||Philosophy of Biological Science|
|Edouard Machery||Epistemology of Experimental Practices|
|Todd Braver, Kendrick Kay||Functional Neuroimaging Methods|
|Casey O’Callaghan||Philosophy of Perception|
|Gillian Russell||Symbolic Logic|
|Anya Plutynski, Ron Mallon||Culture, Cognition and Human Kinds|
|Carl Craver, John Heil||Advanced Philosophy of Science I: causation|
|Julia Driver||Moral Emotions|
|Sai Iyer||Introduction to Relativity|
|Joshua Jackson||Quantitative Methods II|
|Julia Staffel||Advanced Epistemology|
|Carl Craver||Philosophy of Neuroscience|
|Gillian Russell||Proseminar in Philosophy|
|Joshua Jackson||Quantitative Methods I|
|Gillian Russell||Philosophy of Logic|
|Elizabeth Schechter||Philosophy of Psychology|
|Alvin Goldman||Advanced Topics in Metaphysics|
|Michael Strevens||Philosophy of Science: Explanation|
|Michael Devitt||Reference and Experimental Philosophy|
|Ernest Sosa||Advanced Topics in Epistemology|
|Jonathan Schaffer||Advanced Topics in Metaphysics|
|Ned Block, David Carmel||Conceptual and Empirical Issues about Perception, Attention, and Consciousness|
|Christopher Peacocke||Philosophy of Psychology|
|Saul Kripke||Seminar on Naming and Necessity|
Deutsch (2010) claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example,
he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that
there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with intuitions and evaluating it with Deutsch’s arguments. Specifically, I argue that one would find these arguments persuasive if and only if one is
already disposed to exhibit the relevant intuition.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0301-8. You can download the ultimate version of the manuscript here.
The data and vignette translations are available here.
According to Machery (2012), p-values and power don’t measure evidence, but they are mere parameters in the decision rule, where the rule itself is justified independently of the interpretation of p-values and power in evidential terms. Moreover, Machery presents a paradox that is supposed to undermine the interpretation. The paradox—let me call it the p-power paradox—shows that it’s possible for one experiment to provide more evidence supporting the null hypothesis than another experiment when the strength of evidence is measured with p-values, but the two experiments give the same amount of evidence when its strength is measured with power. Since p-values and power, construed as measures of evidential strength, yield different verdicts, Machery concludes that this construal should be abandoned.
However, as I’ll argue, there are ways to avoid the p-power paradox, use power to infer the null, and still interpret p-values as a measure of the strength of evidence (an evidence measure , for short). First, I review the decision rule that can distinguish between the null and the alternative. Then, I discuss the p-power paradox, and show how Machery uses this paradox to argue against the evidential interpretation of p-values. Subsequently, I present two ways of defending this interpretation. According to the first way, the paradox is illusory—there’s nothing paradoxical about the fact that p-values and power sometimes yield inconsistent verdicts. According to the second way, it’s possible to interpret only p-values, but not power, as measuring the strength of evidence, thus dissolving the paradox. If either way succeeds, the p-power paradox doesn’t constitute a reason to abandon the evidential interpretation of p-values.
Lange (2009) offers an argument that, according to him, “does not show merely that some proofs by mathematical induction are not explanatory. It shows that none are […]” (p. 210). I have two aims here: to show that his argument doesn’t succeed, and to offer a positive reason for thinking that some inductive proofs are explanatory. First, I discuss Lange’s argument in detail. Then, using examples from logic and computer science, I show that there are inductive proofs that constitute counterexamples to this argument. Lastly, by drawing a comparison between inductive proofs and some scientific and metaphysical explanations, I argue that these proofs are actually explanatory—that sometimes inductive proofs explain their conclusions, because they point to dependence relations between mathematical objects.
Love can’t be appropriate or inappropriate—at least on the no-reasons view of love (Smuts, forth.; Frankfurt, 2004; Thomas, 1991; Kraut, 1986). According to this view, no one can be irrational in loving a person, and no one can be irrational in not loving, or ceasing to love, a person. Although I think that both these claims are false, here I focus on the former, and argue that there are cases when loving someone is irrational, inappropriate, or unjustified.
First, I narrow down the terms of interests—love and the conditions of appropriateness—discuss the no-reasons view, and show why one might find it appealing. Then, I present two arguments offered by the defenders of the no-reasons view—the argument from unresponsiveness, and the argument from irreplaceability—and show why they don’t succeed. Subsequently, I discuss how the proponents of the no-reasons account defend their view against certain objections, and argue that these responses are insufficient: the defenders of the no-reasons view fail to explain away the intuitions guiding the objections. Finally, I use these very intuitions to motivate an account of love on which loving someone can be irrational.
I have designed and maintained several websites for philosophical envents, organizations, and people in the profession:The website of Moral Psychology Research Group moralpsychology.net The website of the Intellectual Humility & Cultural Diversity in Philosophy project xphi-europe.org/intellectualhumility The website of the conference Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Moral Psychology
Department of Philosophy-Neurocience-Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis
One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899