click here for a pdf of the curriculum vitae


since 2013Ph.D. student at Washington University’s Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program;
Master’s degree in PNP awarded in December 2015
2011Rutgers University, The Department of Philosophy, a year-long visit as a visiting student
2005-2010The University of Wrocław, Master’s degree in Philosophy
2003-2008Wrocław University of Economics, Master’s degree in Management and Marketing
2002-2007The University of Wrocław, Master’s degree in Computer Science

Workshops attended

  1. 20th-22nd May 2015, Formal Epistemology Workshop, Washington University in St. Louis,
  2. 10th–12th September 2009, Ithaca, U.S., GSOEP and CNEF Data Users Conference, a workshop on analyzing data from the Cross-National Equivalent File,
  3. 9th–11th July 2008, Luxembourg, Luxembourg Income Study Summer Workshop, a workshop on analyzing data from the Luxembourg Income Study.

Graduate coursework

Spring 2016
Roddy RoedigerHistory of Psychology
Fall 2015
Carl CraverTopics in Advanced Philosophy of Science I: Evolution
Elizabeth Schechter, Charlie KurthIssues in Moral and Philosophical Psychology
David QuellerPopulation Genetics and Microevolution
Spring 2015
Anya PlutynskiPhilosophy of Biological Science
Edouard MacheryEpistemology of Experimental Practices
Todd Braver, Kendrick KayFunctional Neuroimaging Methods
Casey O’CallaghanPhilosophy of Perception
Fall 2014
Gillian RussellSymbolic Logic
Anya Plutynski, Ron MallonCulture, Cognition and Human Kinds
Carl Craver, John HeilAdvanced Philosophy of Science I: causation
Spring 2014
Julia DriverMoral Emotions
Sai IyerIntroduction to Relativity
Joshua JacksonQuantitative Methods II
Julia StaffelAdvanced Epistemology
Carl CraverPhilosophy of Neuroscience
Fall 2013
Gillian RussellProseminar in Philosophy
Joshua JacksonQuantitative Methods I
Gillian RussellPhilosophy of Logic
Elizabeth SchechterPhilosophy of Psychology

Classes audited in 2011

Fall 2011
Alvin GoldmanAdvanced Topics in Metaphysics
Michael StrevensPhilosophy of Science: Explanation
Michael DevittReference and Experimental Philosophy
Spring 2011
Ernest SosaAdvanced Topics in Epistemology
Jonathan SchafferAdvanced Topics in Metaphysics
Ned Block, David CarmelConceptual and Empirical Issues about Perception, Attention, and Consciousness
Christopher PeacockePhilosophy of Psychology
Saul KripkeSeminar on Naming and Necessity


  1. Scholarship of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education awarded in 2008, 2009, and 2010. This scholarship is granted each year to around 1300 best Polish undergraduate students (out of 2 millions). It covers one’s living expenses for 10 months.
  2. A year-long visit at Rutgers Philosophy Department as a visiting student funded by Rutgers Research Group in Evolution and Higher Cognition ($24,200).


  1. Wysocki (2016), Arguments over intuitions? The Review of Philosophy and Psychology.

    Deutsch (2010) claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with intuitions and evaluating it with Deutsch’s arguments. Specifically, I argue that one would find these arguments persuasive if and only if one is already disposed to exhibit the relevant intuition.
    The final publication is available at Springer via You can download the ultimate version of the manuscript here.
    The data and vignette translations are available here.

  2. Beebe, Runya, Wysocki, Endara (2015), Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective, Journal of Cognition and Culture 15, 386-401.
  3. Stich, Wysocki (2010), Are we really moralizing creatures through and through? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4).

Work in progress

  1. The evidential value of p-values. A paper in the philosophy of statistics on whether p-values can be interpreted as measures of evidence.

    According to Machery (2012), p-values and power don’t measure evidence, but they are mere parameters in the decision rule, where the rule itself is justified independently of the interpretation of p-values and power in evidential terms. Moreover, Machery presents a paradox that is supposed to undermine the interpretation. The paradox—let me call it the p-power paradox—shows that it’s possible for one experiment to provide more evidence supporting the null hypothesis than another experiment when the strength of evidence is measured with p-values, but the two experiments give the same amount of evidence when its strength is measured with power. Since p-values and power, construed as measures of evidential strength, yield different verdicts, Machery concludes that this construal should be abandoned.
    However, as I’ll argue, there are ways to avoid the p-power paradox, use power to infer the null, and still interpret p-values as a measure of the strength of evidence (an evidence measure , for short). First, I review the decision rule that can distinguish between the null and the alternative. Then, I discuss the p-power paradox, and show how Machery uses this paradox to argue against the evidential interpretation of p-values. Subsequently, I present two ways of defending this interpretation. According to the first way, the paradox is illusory—there’s nothing paradoxical about the fact that p-values and power sometimes yield inconsistent verdicts. According to the second way, it’s possible to interpret only p-values, but not power, as measuring the strength of evidence, thus dissolving the paradox. If either way succeeds, the p-power paradox doesn’t constitute a reason to abandon the evidential interpretation of p-values.

  2. Induction, construction, explanation. A paper in the philosophy of mathematics on whether inductive proofs are explanatory.

    Lange (2009) offers an argument that, according to him, “does not show merely that some proofs by mathematical induction are not explanatory. It shows that none are […]” (p. 210). I have two aims here: to show that his argument doesn’t succeed, and to offer a positive reason for thinking that some inductive proofs are explanatory. First, I discuss Lange’s argument in detail. Then, using examples from logic and computer science, I show that there are inductive proofs that constitute counterexamples to this argument. Lastly, by drawing a comparison between inductive proofs and some scientific and metaphysical explanations, I argue that these proofs are actually explanatory—that sometimes inductive proofs explain their conclusions, because they point to dependence relations between mathematical objects.

  3. Inappropriate love. A paper against the no-reasons view of love, on which love can’t be evaluated as rational or irrational.

    Love can’t be appropriate or inappropriate—at least on the no-reasons view of love (Smuts, forth.; Frankfurt, 2004; Thomas, 1991; Kraut, 1986). According to this view, no one can be irrational in loving a person, and no one can be irrational in not loving, or ceasing to love, a person. Although I think that both these claims are false, here I focus on the former, and argue that there are cases when loving someone is irrational, inappropriate, or unjustified.
    First, I narrow down the terms of interests—love and the conditions of appropriateness—discuss the no-reasons view, and show why one might find it appealing. Then, I present two arguments offered by the defenders of the no-reasons view—the argument from unresponsiveness, and the argument from irreplaceability—and show why they don’t succeed. Subsequently, I discuss how the proponents of the no-reasons account defend their view against certain objections, and argue that these responses are insufficient: the defenders of the no-reasons view fail to explain away the intuitions guiding the objections. Finally, I use these very intuitions to motivate an account of love on which loving someone can be irrational.

  4. Vision deranged. An empirical investigation of the everyday concept of seeing.
  5. Normality: a two-faced concept. An empirical investigation of laypersons’ normality ascriptions.
  6. Intuitions aren’t on the rocks. A paper in metaphilosophy on the role of intuitions in reflective equilibrium.


  1. The evidential value of p-values.
    1. 30th March-4th April 2016, San Francisco, USA, Pacific APA 2016.
    2. 6th-7th November 2015, Lexington, USA, Central States Philosophical Association 2015 Conference.
  2. Mathematical induction, grounding, and causal explanations. 2nd-5th March 2016, Chicago, USA, Central APA 2016.
  3. Seeing unreliably. 11th-12th September 2015, Buffalo, USA, Experimental Philosophy Conference.
  4. Normality: a two-faced concept.
    1. 14th-18th July 2015, Tartu, Estonia, European Society for Philosophy and Psychology conference.
    2. 24th-25th April 2015, New York, USA, CUNY Graduate Student Philosophy Conference: Normativity and the Human Sciences.
    3. 17th April, 2015. WashU Work in Progress Seminar.
    4. 20th-22nd March 2014, Seoul, South Korea, Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Moral Psychology, (poster).
  5. Arguments over intuitions?
    1. 1st-4th April 2015, Vancouver, Canada, Pacific APA 2015.
    2. 6th February, 2015, SLU epistemology reading group.
    3. 19th-20th September 2014, Buffalo, USA, Experimental philosophy conference.
    4. 23rd February 2014, St. Louis, USA, 19th Annual Graduate Research Symposium, Washington University in St. Louis (poster).
    5. (with Artur Tanona), 12th-13th September 2013, Bristol, UK, Experimental Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind and Action.
    6. (with Dominik Dziedzic) 8th-9th August 2013, Tokyo, Japan, Epistemology for the Rest of the World.
  6. Intuitions aren’t on the rocks: Against Cappelen’s Philosophy without intuitions
    1. 10th-11th October 2014, Chicago, USA, Central States Philosophical Association 2014 Conference.
    2. 15th-16th November 2013, DeLand, USA, Florida Philosophical Association Conference.
    3. 2nd-4th May 2013, Vienna, Austria, How am I supposed to know?, the University of Vienna
    4. 5th-6th April 2013, New York, USA, CUNY Graduate Center Philosophy Conference
  7. Saving credal reductivism. 3rd-5th July 2014, Warsaw, Poland, Philosophers’ Rally 2014,
  8. The faults of Creepkenstein. 2nd July 2014, Warsaw, Poland, workshop From Content to Contents and Back.
  9. The origins of normative thinking, 13th August 2015, Wroclaw, Poland, lecture for a popular audience:

Selected presentations before graduadte school

  1. Are Intuitions Negotiable? (with Katarzyna Szubert and Dominik Dziedzic), 25th–26th March 2011, New York, USA, Experimental Philosophy Conference.
  2. Faith and justice—an experimental approach in philosophy of religion (with Dominik Dziedzic), 1st May 2010, New York, USA, Experimental Philosophy and Meta-ethics Conference.
  3. Justice behind the veil of ignorance—do real people behave according to Rawls’s conclusions? (with Katarzyna Szubert) 27th–28th March 2010, Kyoto, Japan, How and why economists and philosophers do experiments: dialogue between experimental economics and experimental philosophy.

Teaching assistantship

  1. Fall 2014, for Julia Staffel’s Problems in Philosophy,
    overall evaluation: 5.53 (out of 7); instruction: 5.95; interaction with students: 6.30.
    1. Making arguments (45 min),
    2. Anselm’s ontological argument (2h),
    3. Thought experiments (3h),
    4. Methodological behaviorism (1.5h),
    5. How to write a philosophical paper (30min).
  2. Spring 2015, for Julia Staffel’s Problems in Philosophy,
    overall evaluation: 5.88 (out of 7); instruction: 5.95; interaction with students: 6.02.
    1. Moore’s proof (1.5h),
    2. Anselm’s ontological argument (1.5h),
    3. Thought experiments (3h),
    4. Functionalism in the philosophy of mind (1.5h),
    5. How to write a philosophical paper (30min).
  3. Fall 2015, for Julia Driver’s Present Moral Problems,
    1. On Hardin’s lifeboat ethics (1.5h),
    2. On genetic enhancement: On Sandel’s Case Against Perfection (3h × 2 sections),
    3. How to write a philosophical paper (30min).

Teaching workshops at Washington Univ. in St. Louis

  1. March 3rd 2015, Applying Cognitive Science to Improve Teaching
  2. September 2nd 2015, Writing a Teaching Philosophy Statement
  3. October 1st 2015, Designing Effective Writing Assignments
  4. October 29th 2015, Developing Rubrics to Grade Student Writing


I have designed and maintained several websites for philosophical envents, organizations, and people in the profession:

The website of Moral Psychology Research Group The website of the Intellectual Humility & Cultural Diversity in Philosophy project The website of the conference Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Moral Psychology
that took place in Seoul, 20th-22nd March 2014
The website of the conference Epistemology for the Rest of the World
that took place in Tokyo, 8th-9th August 2013
John Doris’s personal website

Tomasz Wysocki

Department of Philosophy-Neurocience-Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis
One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899


Copyright © 2015, Tom Wysocki